The signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between Canada, Mexico, and the US in 1992 constituted the first time the US had completed a free trade agreement (FTA) that included a developing country. Similar FTAs have subsequently been negotiated between the US and developing countries, especially since the office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) announced its strategy of competitive liberalization in 2002. Ostensibly, these bilateral deals with “can-do” developing countries such as Chile and Peru are meant to trigger additional FTAs with the US that would eventually add up to a more liberalized global trade network involving countries atvarying stages of development (Colvin, 2004). This, in essence, is the US strategy of competitive liberalization as it has been articulated by the USTR during the 2000s. While this strategy has not been confined to the developing countries, even those FTAs signed with such developed countries as Canada (1988), Singapore (2003), and Australia (2004) follow this asymmetrical pattern. Our purpose here is to analyze and shed light on the dynamics of those more asymmetric FTAs that fall within the domain of North-South and North-North relations. In particular, we seek to better specify and critique US motives and expectations around competitive liberalization as this strategy is now playing out in Latin America and Asia.