Biblioteca Digital de VanguardiaFrom Offsetting to Emulation: A Neoclassical Realist Analysis of Russia’s Internal Balancing Strategies
In 2008, Russia began to implement its largest military reform since the creation of the Red Army in 1918. Previous attempts at reforms in 1992, 1997, and 2003 did not result in fundamental transformations to the country’s military. Why was the 2008 military reform successful while others were not?...
| Autor principal: | |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Revistas |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
| Publicado: |
FLACSO - Sede Ecuador
2022
|
| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.flacsoandes.edu.ec/urvio/article/view/5365 |
| _version_ | 1809907059934625792 |
|---|---|
| author | Dall'Agnol, Augusto |
| author_facet | Dall'Agnol, Augusto |
| author_sort | Dall'Agnol, Augusto |
| collection | Revista |
| description | In 2008, Russia began to implement its largest military reform since the creation of the Red Army in 1918. Previous attempts at reforms in 1992, 1997, and 2003 did not result in fundamental transformations to the country’s military. Why was the 2008 military reform successful while others were not? This article uses the comparative-historical method to identify the causal mechanisms between Russia’s level of external threat, state capacity, and internal balancing strategies adopted since 1991. It advances Neoclassical Realism’s systemic and unit-level variables by building on the long-established contributions from Strategic Studies and Historical Sociology instead of relying on other International Relations theories. It concludes that the success of Russia’s military reforms in the post-Cold War period depended on the simultaneous existence of three conditions: the possibility of disrupting strategic stability, its ability to extract and mobilize societal resources, and the presence of some event of proven ineffectiveness. Under scenarios in which only one or two of these conditions were present, Russia carried out only partial military reforms. The article sheds light on three often-neglected drivers of Russia’s military reform by Western analysts: its enduring emphasis on interstate competition, strategic stability, and mid-to-high intensity conventional warfare.
|
| format | Revistas |
| id | urvio-article-5365 |
| institution | URVIO. Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios de Seguridad |
| language | Español |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| publisher | FLACSO - Sede Ecuador |
| record_format | ojs |
| spelling | urvio-article-53652022-10-03T15:40:53Z From Offsetting to Emulation: A Neoclassical Realist Analysis of Russia’s Internal Balancing Strategies De la compensación a la emulación: un análisis realista neoclásico de las estrategias de contrapeso interno de Rusia Dall'Agnol, Augusto digitalización Fuerzas Armadas Rusia seguridad sociología histórica Russia Neoclassicla realism Military reform Internal balancing State-building In 2008, Russia began to implement its largest military reform since the creation of the Red Army in 1918. Previous attempts at reforms in 1992, 1997, and 2003 did not result in fundamental transformations to the country’s military. Why was the 2008 military reform successful while others were not? This article uses the comparative-historical method to identify the causal mechanisms between Russia’s level of external threat, state capacity, and internal balancing strategies adopted since 1991. It advances Neoclassical Realism’s systemic and unit-level variables by building on the long-established contributions from Strategic Studies and Historical Sociology instead of relying on other International Relations theories. It concludes that the success of Russia’s military reforms in the post-Cold War period depended on the simultaneous existence of three conditions: the possibility of disrupting strategic stability, its ability to extract and mobilize societal resources, and the presence of some event of proven ineffectiveness. Under scenarios in which only one or two of these conditions were present, Russia carried out only partial military reforms. The article sheds light on three often-neglected drivers of Russia’s military reform by Western analysts: its enduring emphasis on interstate competition, strategic stability, and mid-to-high intensity conventional warfare. En 2008, Rusia comenzó a implementar su reforma militar más grande desde la creación del Ejército Rojo en 1918. Los intentos anteriores, en 1992, 1997 y 2003, no lograron transformaciones fundamentales en sus fuerzas armadas. ¿Por qué la reforma militar de 2008 tuvo éxito y otras no? Este artículo utiliza el método histórico comparativo para identificar los mecanismos causales entre el nivel de amenaza externa de Rusia, su nivel de capacidad estatal y sus estrategias de contrapeso interno adoptadas desde 1991. Además, este análisis avanza las variables sistémicas y unitarias del realismo neoclásico, basándose en las contribuciones de los estudios estratégicos y la sociología histórica, en detrimento de otras teorías de las Relaciones Internacionales. En síntesis, el éxito de las reformas militares en Rusia, en el período posterior a la Guerra Fría, depende de la existencia simultánea de tres condiciones: la posibilidad de perturbar la estabilidad estratégica, la capacidad del Estado ruso de extraer y movilizar recursos sociales, y la existencia de algún evento de ineficacia probada. En escenarios en que solo una o dos de estas condiciones están presentes, los rusos llevaron a cabo solo reformas parciales. Finalmente, el artículo arroja luz sobre tres impulsores de la reforma militar de Rusia, a menudo descuidados por analistas occidentales: su continuo énfasis en la competencia interestatal, la estabilidad estratégica y la guerra convencional de media y alta intensidad. FLACSO - Sede Ecuador 2022-05-31 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html text/html https://revistas.flacsoandes.edu.ec/urvio/article/view/5365 10.17141/urvio.33.2022.5365 URVIO. Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios de Seguridad; No. 33 (2022): Urvio. Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios de Seguridad (mayo-agosto); 87-108 URVIO. Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios de Seguridad; Núm. 33 (2022): Urvio. Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios de Seguridad (mayo-agosto); 87-108 1390-4299 1390-3691 10.17141/urvio.33.2022 spa https://revistas.flacsoandes.edu.ec/urvio/article/view/5365/4127 https://revistas.flacsoandes.edu.ec/urvio/article/view/5365/4118 https://revistas.flacsoandes.edu.ec/urvio/article/view/5365/4119 Derechos de autor 2022 Augusto Dall'Agnol |
| spellingShingle | Dall'Agnol, Augusto From Offsetting to Emulation: A Neoclassical Realist Analysis of Russia’s Internal Balancing Strategies |
| title | From Offsetting to Emulation: A Neoclassical Realist Analysis of Russia’s Internal Balancing Strategies |
| title_full | From Offsetting to Emulation: A Neoclassical Realist Analysis of Russia’s Internal Balancing Strategies |
| title_fullStr | From Offsetting to Emulation: A Neoclassical Realist Analysis of Russia’s Internal Balancing Strategies |
| title_full_unstemmed | From Offsetting to Emulation: A Neoclassical Realist Analysis of Russia’s Internal Balancing Strategies |
| title_short | From Offsetting to Emulation: A Neoclassical Realist Analysis of Russia’s Internal Balancing Strategies |
| title_sort | from offsetting to emulation: a neoclassical realist analysis of russia’s internal balancing strategies |
| url | https://revistas.flacsoandes.edu.ec/urvio/article/view/5365 |