Biblioteca Digital de VanguardiaNo Place for Military Counterintelligence in Argentina: Analysis of a Possible Legal Gap
The legislation of Argentina establishes four activities for the National Intelligence System: national intelligence, counterintelligence, criminal intelligence and, at least, military-strategic intelligence. The Direction on National Military-Strategic Intelligence (DINIEM), under the Mi...
| Autor principal: | |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Revistas |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
| Publicado: |
FLACSO - Sede Ecuador
2020
|
| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.flacsoandes.edu.ec/urvio/article/view/4214 |
| _version_ | 1809907045960253440 |
|---|---|
| author | Tripolone, Gerardo |
| author_facet | Tripolone, Gerardo |
| author_sort | Tripolone, Gerardo |
| collection | Revista |
| description |
The legislation of Argentina establishes four activities for the National Intelligence System: national intelligence, counterintelligence, criminal intelligence and, at least, military-strategic intelligence. The Direction on National Military-Strategic Intelligence (DINIEM), under the Ministry of Defense, produces the military-strategic intelligence, while the Federal Intelligence Agency produces counterintelligence. The aim of this paper is to study a legal problem that has not been addressed in literature: the lack of regulation on military counterintelligence, which has no place in the national legislation. The executive branch has decided that the DINIEM carries out at least part of the military counterintelligence activities. This decision enables a military office to carry out an intelligence task inside the State, something that stresses the legal limits of the operations of Armed Forces. The methodology of legal science is used to analyze the problem, but taking into account the historical and political context of the legislation. It is concluded that the legislation allows the executive branch to decide discretionally about the appointed office to develop military counterintelligence. |
| format | Revistas |
| id | urvio-article-4214 |
| institution | URVIO. Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios de Seguridad |
| language | Español |
| publishDate | 2020 |
| publisher | FLACSO - Sede Ecuador |
| record_format | ojs |
| spelling | urvio-article-42142021-07-13T03:38:44Z No Place for Military Counterintelligence in Argentina: Analysis of a Possible Legal Gap Sin lugar para la contrainteligencia militar en Argentina: análisis jurídico de un posible vacío legal Tripolone, Gerardo The legislation of Argentina establishes four activities for the National Intelligence System: national intelligence, counterintelligence, criminal intelligence and, at least, military-strategic intelligence. The Direction on National Military-Strategic Intelligence (DINIEM), under the Ministry of Defense, produces the military-strategic intelligence, while the Federal Intelligence Agency produces counterintelligence. The aim of this paper is to study a legal problem that has not been addressed in literature: the lack of regulation on military counterintelligence, which has no place in the national legislation. The executive branch has decided that the DINIEM carries out at least part of the military counterintelligence activities. This decision enables a military office to carry out an intelligence task inside the State, something that stresses the legal limits of the operations of Armed Forces. The methodology of legal science is used to analyze the problem, but taking into account the historical and political context of the legislation. It is concluded that the legislation allows the executive branch to decide discretionally about the appointed office to develop military counterintelligence. La legislación argentina establece cuatro actividades para el Sistema de Inteligencia Nacional: inteligencia nacional, contrainteligencia, inteligencia criminal e inteligencia estratégico militar. La Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia Estratégico Militar (DINIEM), dependiente del Ministerio de Defensa, es la encargada de realizar la última tarea nombrada, mientras que la ley coloca a cargo de la Agencia Federal de Inteligencia la producción de contrainteligencia. El objetivo de este artículo es abordar un problema jurídico que no ha sido tratado por la literatura especializada: la falta de regulación precisa de la contrainteligencia militar, actividad que no encuentra un lugar claro en la legislación. Mediante decretos del Poder Ejecutivo, la tarea es llevada adelante por la DINIEM, al menos parcialmente, lo cual tensiona la legislación de defensa nacional, que veda el involucramiento de las Fuerzas Armadas en asuntos internos del Estado, en especial en tareas de inteligencia. La metodología empleada es la propia de la ciencia jurídica, pero atendiendo al contexto histórico-político de la normativa que se analiza. Se concluye que la legislación nacional ha habilitado un margen de discrecionalidad en el Poder Ejecutivo, que permite asignar la función de contrainteligencia militar a más de un organismo, con todos los problemas que esto genera. Abstract The legislation of Argentina establishes four activities for the National Intelligence System: national intelligence, counterintelligence, criminal intelligence and, at least, military-strategic intelligence. The Direction on National Military-Strategic Intelligence (DINIEM), under the Ministry of Defense, produces the military-strategic intelligence, while the Federal Intelligence Agency produces counterintelligence. The aim of this paper is to study a legal problem that has not been addressed in literature: the lack of regulation on military counterintelligence, which has no place in the national legislation. The executive branch has decided that the DINIEM carries out at least part of the military counterintelligence activities. This decision enables a military office to carry out an intelligence task inside the State, something that stresses the legal limits of the operations of Armed Forces. The methodology of legal science is used to analyze the problem, but taking into account the historical and political context of the legislation. It is concluded that the legislation allows the executive branch to decide discretionally about the appointed office to develop military counterintelligence. FLACSO - Sede Ecuador 2020-02-11 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html application/zip https://revistas.flacsoandes.edu.ec/urvio/article/view/4214 10.17141/urvio.26.2020.4214 URVIO. Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios de Seguridad; No. 26 (2020): Urvio. Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios de Seguridad (enero-abril); 24-36 URVIO. Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios de Seguridad; Núm. 26 (2020): Urvio. Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios de Seguridad (enero-abril); 24-36 1390-4299 1390-3691 10.17141/urvio.26.2020 spa https://revistas.flacsoandes.edu.ec/urvio/article/view/4214/3277 https://revistas.flacsoandes.edu.ec/urvio/article/view/4214/3259 https://revistas.flacsoandes.edu.ec/urvio/article/view/4214/3285 Derechos de autor 2020 URVIO. Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios de Seguridad |
| spellingShingle | Tripolone, Gerardo No Place for Military Counterintelligence in Argentina: Analysis of a Possible Legal Gap |
| title | No Place for Military Counterintelligence in Argentina: Analysis of a Possible Legal Gap |
| title_full | No Place for Military Counterintelligence in Argentina: Analysis of a Possible Legal Gap |
| title_fullStr | No Place for Military Counterintelligence in Argentina: Analysis of a Possible Legal Gap |
| title_full_unstemmed | No Place for Military Counterintelligence in Argentina: Analysis of a Possible Legal Gap |
| title_short | No Place for Military Counterintelligence in Argentina: Analysis of a Possible Legal Gap |
| title_sort | no place for military counterintelligence in argentina: analysis of a possible legal gap |
| url | https://revistas.flacsoandes.edu.ec/urvio/article/view/4214 |