Biblioteca Digital de VanguardiaImpunity and criminal deterrence of control against corruption in Ecuador: The case of the Anticorruption Commission 1998-2008
The efficiency of the control policy of a State has the dual task, to provide appropriate incentives in the public and private agents, which deter unlawful acts, without neglecting an optimal level of control (Polinsky and Shavell 2007), that minimizes the social cost of criminal activity. The econo...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Formato: | Revistas |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
| Publicado: |
FLACSO - Sede Ecuador
2016
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| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.flacsoandes.edu.ec/urvio/article/view/2238 |
| _version_ | 1809907024215932928 |
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| author | Olivo Espín, Cielito Berenice |
| author_facet | Olivo Espín, Cielito Berenice |
| author_sort | Olivo Espín, Cielito Berenice |
| collection | Revista |
| description | The efficiency of the control policy of a State has the dual task, to provide appropriate incentives in the public and private agents, which deter unlawful acts, without neglecting an optimal level of control (Polinsky and Shavell 2007), that minimizes the social cost of criminal activity. The economic theory of criminal behavior proposes its approach, based on criteria of rational choice concerning stable agent preferences and incentives to unlawful conduct, disregarding moral aspects. The theoretical model of criminal deterrence (Becker 1968) lists the possible incentives for agents, regarding the deterrence capability of these control systems and the perceived efficiency of its operation, thus providing information for predictive analysis on the strategic behavior of individuals and establishes parameters for the analysis of control policies, from an economic perspective. This paper proposes an application of the theoretical model of criminal deterrence (Becker 1968) for corruption control, based on the case of the Anti-Corruption Commission of Ecuador, in the period 1998-2008. |
| format | Revistas |
| id | urvio-article-2238 |
| institution | URVIO. Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios de Seguridad |
| language | Español |
| publishDate | 2016 |
| publisher | FLACSO - Sede Ecuador |
| record_format | ojs |
| spelling | urvio-article-22382021-07-13T03:40:09Z Impunity and criminal deterrence of control against corruption in Ecuador: The case of the Anticorruption Commission 1998-2008 Impunidad y disuasión criminal del control anticorrupción en Ecuador: el caso de la Comisión Anticorrupción 1998 - 2008 Olivo Espín, Cielito Berenice corrupción disuasión comportamiento criminal políticas racional incentivos. Corruption deterrence behavior criminal policies rational incentives. The efficiency of the control policy of a State has the dual task, to provide appropriate incentives in the public and private agents, which deter unlawful acts, without neglecting an optimal level of control (Polinsky and Shavell 2007), that minimizes the social cost of criminal activity. The economic theory of criminal behavior proposes its approach, based on criteria of rational choice concerning stable agent preferences and incentives to unlawful conduct, disregarding moral aspects. The theoretical model of criminal deterrence (Becker 1968) lists the possible incentives for agents, regarding the deterrence capability of these control systems and the perceived efficiency of its operation, thus providing information for predictive analysis on the strategic behavior of individuals and establishes parameters for the analysis of control policies, from an economic perspective. This paper proposes an application of the theoretical model of criminal deterrence (Becker 1968) for corruption control, based on the case of the Anti-Corruption Commission of Ecuador, in the period 1998-2008. La eficiencia de la política de control de un Estado tiene la doble tarea de generar incentivos adecuados en los agentes públicos y privados, que los disuadan de cometer actos ilícitos, sin descuidar el ejercicio de un nivel óptimo de control (Polinsky y Shavell 2007), que minimice el costo social del delito . La teoría económica del comportamiento criminal propone su abordaje, a partir de criterios de elección racional, relativos a las preferencias estables de los agentes y sus incentivos hacia un comportamiento ilícito, sin consideraciones de categoría moral. El modelo teórico de disuasión criminal (Becker 1968) relaciona los posibles incentivos de los agentes, respecto de la capacidad de disuasión de los sistemas de control y la percepción de eficiencia de su funcionamiento, lo que permite contar con información para un análisis predictivo sobre el comportamiento estratégico de las personas y establece parámetros para el análisis de las políticas de control, a partir de una perspectiva económica. El artículo formula un ejercicio de aplicación del modelo teórico de disuasión criminal (Becker 1968), para la actividad de control de la corrupción, a partir del caso de la Comisión Anticorrupción de Ecuador, en el período 1998 - 2008. FLACSO - Sede Ecuador 2016-06-23 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf application/zip application/zip https://revistas.flacsoandes.edu.ec/urvio/article/view/2238 10.17141/urvio.18.2016.2238 URVIO. Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios de Seguridad; No. 18 (2016): Urvio. Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios de Seguridad (Junio-noviembre); 41-60 URVIO. Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios de Seguridad; Núm. 18 (2016): Urvio. Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios de Seguridad (Junio-noviembre); 41-60 1390-4299 1390-3691 10.17141/urvio.18.2016 spa https://revistas.flacsoandes.edu.ec/urvio/article/view/2238/1461 https://revistas.flacsoandes.edu.ec/urvio/article/view/2238/2405 https://revistas.flacsoandes.edu.ec/urvio/article/view/2238/2406 Derechos de autor 2016 URVIO - Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios de Seguridad |
| spellingShingle | Olivo Espín, Cielito Berenice Impunity and criminal deterrence of control against corruption in Ecuador: The case of the Anticorruption Commission 1998-2008 |
| title | Impunity and criminal deterrence of control against corruption in Ecuador: The case of the Anticorruption Commission 1998-2008 |
| title_full | Impunity and criminal deterrence of control against corruption in Ecuador: The case of the Anticorruption Commission 1998-2008 |
| title_fullStr | Impunity and criminal deterrence of control against corruption in Ecuador: The case of the Anticorruption Commission 1998-2008 |
| title_full_unstemmed | Impunity and criminal deterrence of control against corruption in Ecuador: The case of the Anticorruption Commission 1998-2008 |
| title_short | Impunity and criminal deterrence of control against corruption in Ecuador: The case of the Anticorruption Commission 1998-2008 |
| title_sort | impunity and criminal deterrence of control against corruption in ecuador: the case of the anticorruption commission 1998-2008 |
| url | https://revistas.flacsoandes.edu.ec/urvio/article/view/2238 |