| Sumario: | The efficiency of the control policy of a State has the dual task, to provide appropriate incentives in the public and private agents, which deter unlawful acts, without neglecting an optimal level of control (Polinsky and Shavell 2007), that minimizes the social cost of criminal activity. The economic theory of criminal behavior proposes its approach, based on criteria of rational choice concerning stable agent preferences and incentives to unlawful conduct, disregarding moral aspects. The theoretical model of criminal deterrence (Becker 1968) lists the possible incentives for agents, regarding the deterrence capability of these control systems and the perceived efficiency of its operation, thus providing information for predictive analysis on the strategic behavior of individuals and establishes parameters for the analysis of control policies, from an economic perspective. This paper proposes an application of the theoretical model of criminal deterrence (Becker 1968) for corruption control, based on the case of the Anti-Corruption Commission of Ecuador, in the period 1998-2008.
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