Biblioteca Digital de VanguardiaThe independence of the central bank and its role in the domination of financial capital over the State
The following work analyzes the role of the independence of the central bank in the relationship between the financial sector and the State at a theoretical level. In order to accomplish this task, the nature of the central bank is considered: the public institution, on the one hand, and the represe...
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| Formato: | Revistas |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
| Publicado: |
Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, Sede Ecuador
2020
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| Acceso en línea: | https://iconos.flacsoandes.edu.ec/index.php/iconos/article/view/3901 |
| _version_ | 1782344282498138112 |
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| author | Pierre-Manigat, Matari |
| author_facet | Pierre-Manigat, Matari |
| author_sort | Pierre-Manigat, Matari |
| collection | Revista |
| description | The following work analyzes the role of the independence of the central bank in the relationship between the financial sector and the State at a theoretical level. In order to accomplish this task, the nature of the central bank is considered: the public institution, on the one hand, and the representative of the financial class, on the other hand. The duality determines the place of the bank in the machine of the State, as well as its relationship with the public Hacienda (or treasury). From a methodological focus that combines economy and political sociology, the links between the central bank and the public Hacienda that conform the organizational structure of the State, are highlighted. Its characterization is necessary in order to analyze the role of the State in the reproduction of a regime of accumulation. The “big crises” – or the crises of regimes of accumulation – determine the fundamental changes in the organizational structure of the State. The independence of the central bank became the litmus test for the reconfiguration of the structure of capitalism today. This is where the main conclusion of this work stems from: the organizational structure associated with the independence of the central bank operates like a transmission belt of financial domination in the State and the contemporary political arena. |
| format | Revistas |
| id | iconos-article-3901 |
| institution | Íconos - Revista de Ciencias Sociales |
| language | Español |
| publishDate | 2020 |
| publisher | Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, Sede Ecuador |
| record_format | ojs |
| spelling | iconos-article-39012023-02-08T15:50:57Z The independence of the central bank and its role in the domination of financial capital over the State La independencia del banco central y su papel en el dominio del capital financiero sobre el Estado A independência do banco central e seu papel no domínio do capital financeiro sobre o Estado Pierre-Manigat, Matari banco central campo político capital financeiro Estado Fazenda pública política monetária Banco central campo político capital financiero Estado Hacienda pública política monetaria central bank political arena financial capital State public Hacienda monetary policy The following work analyzes the role of the independence of the central bank in the relationship between the financial sector and the State at a theoretical level. In order to accomplish this task, the nature of the central bank is considered: the public institution, on the one hand, and the representative of the financial class, on the other hand. The duality determines the place of the bank in the machine of the State, as well as its relationship with the public Hacienda (or treasury). From a methodological focus that combines economy and political sociology, the links between the central bank and the public Hacienda that conform the organizational structure of the State, are highlighted. Its characterization is necessary in order to analyze the role of the State in the reproduction of a regime of accumulation. The “big crises” – or the crises of regimes of accumulation – determine the fundamental changes in the organizational structure of the State. The independence of the central bank became the litmus test for the reconfiguration of the structure of capitalism today. This is where the main conclusion of this work stems from: the organizational structure associated with the independence of the central bank operates like a transmission belt of financial domination in the State and the contemporary political arena. El presente trabajo analiza –a un nivel teórico– el papel de la independencia del banco central en las relaciones entre el capital financiero y el Estado. Para ello, se considera la naturaleza dual del banco central: institución pública, por un lado, y representante de la clase financiera, por el otro. La dualidad determina el lugar del banco en la máquina de Estado, así como sus relaciones con la Hacienda pública (o Tesoro). A partir de un enfoque metodológico que combina la economía y la sociología política, se muestra cómo los lazos entre el banco central y la Hacienda pública conforman lo que se designa como estructura organizacional del Estado. Su caracterización es decisiva para analizar el papel del Estado en la reproducción de un régimen de acumulación. Las “grandes crisis” –o crisis de régimen de acumulación– determinan los cambios fundamentales en la estructura organizacional del Estado. La independencia del banco central se convirtió en la piedra de toque de la reconfiguración de esta estructura en el capitalismo de hoy. De ahí la principal conclusión de este trabajo: la estructura organizacional asociada con la independencia del banco central opera como correa de transmisión de la dominación financiera en el Estado y en el campo político contemporáneo. Este artigo analisa, em nível teórico, o papel da independência do banco central nas relações entre capital financeiro e Estado. Para isso, considera-se a natureza dupla do banco central: instituição pública, por um lado, e representante da classe financeira, por outro. A dualidade determina o lugar do banco na máquina do Estado, bem como suas relações com o Fazenda Pública (ou Tesouro). Com base em uma abordagem metodológica que combina economia e sociologia política, mostra-se como os laços entre o banco central e o tesouro público compõem o que é designado como a estrutura organizacional do Estado. Sua caracterização é decisiva para analisar o papel do Estado na reprodução de um regime de acumulação. As "grandes crises", ou crises do regime de acumulação, determinam as mudanças fundamentais na estrutura organizacional do Estado. A independência do banco central tornou-se a pedra de toque da reconfiguração dessa estrutura no capitalismo de hoje. Daí a principal conclusão deste trabalho: a estrutura organizacional associada à independência do banco central funciona como um cinto de transmissão da dominação financeira no Estado e no campo político contemporâneo. Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, Sede Ecuador 2020-01-01 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Artículo evaluado por pares application/pdf text/html application/xml application/zip https://iconos.flacsoandes.edu.ec/index.php/iconos/article/view/3901 10.17141/iconos.66.2020.3901 Íconos - Revista de Ciencias Sociales; Núm. 66 (2020): Comunidad, vulnerabilidad y reproducción en condiciones de desastre. Abordajes desde América Latina y el Caribe; 213-229 Íconos - Revista de Ciencias Sociales; n. 66 (2020): Comunidade, vulnerabilidade y reprodução em condições de desastre. Abordagem desde América Latina e Caribe; 213-229 Íconos. Revista de Ciencias Sociales; No. 66 (2020): Community, vulnerability and reproduction in disaster conditions. Approaches from Latin America and the Caribbean; 213-229 1390-8065 1390-1249 spa https://iconos.flacsoandes.edu.ec/index.php/iconos/article/view/3901/3220 https://iconos.flacsoandes.edu.ec/index.php/iconos/article/view/3901/3242 https://iconos.flacsoandes.edu.ec/index.php/iconos/article/view/3901/3256 https://iconos.flacsoandes.edu.ec/index.php/iconos/article/view/3901/3274 Derechos de autor 2020 Matari Pierre-Manigat https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0/deed.es_ES |
| spellingShingle | Pierre-Manigat, Matari The independence of the central bank and its role in the domination of financial capital over the State |
| title | The independence of the central bank and its role in the domination of financial capital over the State |
| title_full | The independence of the central bank and its role in the domination of financial capital over the State |
| title_fullStr | The independence of the central bank and its role in the domination of financial capital over the State |
| title_full_unstemmed | The independence of the central bank and its role in the domination of financial capital over the State |
| title_short | The independence of the central bank and its role in the domination of financial capital over the State |
| title_sort | independence of the central bank and its role in the domination of financial capital over the state |
| url | https://iconos.flacsoandes.edu.ec/index.php/iconos/article/view/3901 |