Predispositions to the Good (Anlagen zum Gute)

In Part I of Religion within the boundaries of Mere Reason, Kant distinguishes three predispositions to the good: animality, humanity, and personality (R 6:26). Unlike the propensities to evil, which are “contingent for humanity in general” (R 6:29), the predispositions to good are “original (urspru...

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Autor principal: Muchnik, Pablo
Formato: info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Lenguaje:Portugués
Publicado: Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências 2019
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Acceso en línea:https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/ek/article/view/8691
http://biblioteca-repositorio.clacso.edu.ar/handle/CLACSO/72738
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author Muchnik, Pablo
author_facet Muchnik, Pablo
author_sort Muchnik, Pablo
collection Repositorio
description In Part I of Religion within the boundaries of Mere Reason, Kant distinguishes three predispositions to the good: animality, humanity, and personality (R 6:26). Unlike the propensities to evil, which are “contingent for humanity in general” (R 6:29), the predispositions to good are “original (ursprunglich), for they belong to the possibility of human nature” (R 6:28). Animality and humanity express two different variants of self-love (“mechanical” and “comparing”), whose mode of operation can be traced back to Rousseau’s distinction between “amour de soi” and “amour propre.” Seen this way, the predispositions to the good are not merely determinants of our anthropological structure, but have also a diachronic implication. Animality designates the characteristic moral outlook of agents in the state of nature, while humanity expresses the moral orientation of civilized individuals (their unsociable sociability). Upon these tendencies, Kant believes, all sorts of vices can be grafted. The predisposition to personality, however, stands as a category all of its own: it is irreducible to self-love and immune to any moral corruption (a feature of great importance for the prospects of moral regeneration). Kant conceives of personality as the end towards which all the other predispositions to the good contribute as necessary conditions. The attainment of this end requires a qualitative shift in the moral orientation of the human species, a transformation without which it would impossible for the species to comply with the collective duty of realizing the highest good.
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spelling clacso-CLACSO727382022-03-21T17:55:47Z Predispositions to the Good (Anlagen zum Gute) Muchnik, Pablo propensity to evil moral anthropology animality humanity personality vices of savagery vices of civilization amour de soi amour propre unsociable sociability In Part I of Religion within the boundaries of Mere Reason, Kant distinguishes three predispositions to the good: animality, humanity, and personality (R 6:26). Unlike the propensities to evil, which are “contingent for humanity in general” (R 6:29), the predispositions to good are “original (ursprunglich), for they belong to the possibility of human nature” (R 6:28). Animality and humanity express two different variants of self-love (“mechanical” and “comparing”), whose mode of operation can be traced back to Rousseau’s distinction between “amour de soi” and “amour propre.” Seen this way, the predispositions to the good are not merely determinants of our anthropological structure, but have also a diachronic implication. Animality designates the characteristic moral outlook of agents in the state of nature, while humanity expresses the moral orientation of civilized individuals (their unsociable sociability). Upon these tendencies, Kant believes, all sorts of vices can be grafted. The predisposition to personality, however, stands as a category all of its own: it is irreducible to self-love and immune to any moral corruption (a feature of great importance for the prospects of moral regeneration). Kant conceives of personality as the end towards which all the other predispositions to the good contribute as necessary conditions. The attainment of this end requires a qualitative shift in the moral orientation of the human species, a transformation without which it would impossible for the species to comply with the collective duty of realizing the highest good. 2019-01-29 2022-03-21T17:55:47Z 2022-03-21T17:55:47Z info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/ek/article/view/8691 10.36311/2318-0501.2018.v6n2.19.p97 http://biblioteca-repositorio.clacso.edu.ar/handle/CLACSO/72738 por https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/ek/article/view/8691/5603 Copyright (c) 2018 Estudos Kantianos [EK] application/pdf Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências Kantian Studies (EK); Vol. 6 No. 2 (2018); 97-100 Estudos Kantianos [EK]; v. 6 n. 2 (2018); 97-100 2318-0501
spellingShingle propensity to evil
moral anthropology
animality
humanity
personality
vices of savagery
vices of civilization
amour de soi
amour propre
unsociable sociability
Muchnik, Pablo
Predispositions to the Good (Anlagen zum Gute)
title Predispositions to the Good (Anlagen zum Gute)
title_full Predispositions to the Good (Anlagen zum Gute)
title_fullStr Predispositions to the Good (Anlagen zum Gute)
title_full_unstemmed Predispositions to the Good (Anlagen zum Gute)
title_short Predispositions to the Good (Anlagen zum Gute)
title_sort predispositions to the good (anlagen zum gute)
topic propensity to evil
moral anthropology
animality
humanity
personality
vices of savagery
vices of civilization
amour de soi
amour propre
unsociable sociability
url https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/ek/article/view/8691
http://biblioteca-repositorio.clacso.edu.ar/handle/CLACSO/72738