Biblioteca Digital de VanguardiaRemarks on “the Only Original Right Belonging to Every Man by Virtue of His Humanity”
Kant compares a merely empirical doctrine of right to the wooden head in Phaedru’s fable, i. e. a head that has nobrain (MS AA 06: 229). An a priori right may be acquired or innate. According to Kant, there is only one innate right (MS AA 06: 237). That only one innate right is freedom. In that cont...
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| Formato: | info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
| Lenguaje: | Portugués |
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Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências
2015
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| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/ek/article/view/5119 http://biblioteca-repositorio.clacso.edu.ar/handle/CLACSO/72599 |
| _version_ | 1782336328999895040 |
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| author | FAGGION, Andrea |
| author_facet | FAGGION, Andrea |
| author_sort | FAGGION, Andrea |
| collection | Repositorio |
| description | Kant compares a merely empirical doctrine of right to the wooden head in Phaedru’s fable, i. e. a head that has nobrain (MS AA 06: 229). An a priori right may be acquired or innate. According to Kant, there is only one innate right (MS AA 06: 237). That only one innate right is freedom. In that context, freedom means “independence from being constrained by another’s choice” (MS AA 06: 237). As a moral right, such a right implies reciprocity. This being so, it is a right to be held “insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law” (MS AA 06: 237). The reason why it is an innate right is that it is a “right belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity” (MS AA 06: 237). This paper aims to clarify a few issues regarding our innate right to freedom. To start with, we need a deeper understanding of the meaning of freedom as independence from being constrained by another’s choice. I will claim that such an independence should be understood as absence from fraudand violence. Following, it is in order to analyze the condition according to which freedom is a right: coexistence with the freedom of every other in accord with a universal law. I will claim that such a condition does not imply political authority. Finally, we have to handle the connection between the innate right to freedom and our humanity. I will claim that the innate right to freedomcannot be disconnected from the second formula of the categorical imperative. |
| format | info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
| id | clacso-CLACSO72599 |
| institution | CLACSO, Repositorio Digital |
| language | Portugués |
| publishDate | 2015 |
| publisher | Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências |
| record_format | greenstone |
| spelling | clacso-CLACSO725992022-03-21T17:55:33Z Remarks on “the Only Original Right Belonging to Every Man by Virtue of His Humanity” FAGGION, Andrea Kant compares a merely empirical doctrine of right to the wooden head in Phaedru’s fable, i. e. a head that has nobrain (MS AA 06: 229). An a priori right may be acquired or innate. According to Kant, there is only one innate right (MS AA 06: 237). That only one innate right is freedom. In that context, freedom means “independence from being constrained by another’s choice” (MS AA 06: 237). As a moral right, such a right implies reciprocity. This being so, it is a right to be held “insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law” (MS AA 06: 237). The reason why it is an innate right is that it is a “right belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity” (MS AA 06: 237). This paper aims to clarify a few issues regarding our innate right to freedom. To start with, we need a deeper understanding of the meaning of freedom as independence from being constrained by another’s choice. I will claim that such an independence should be understood as absence from fraudand violence. Following, it is in order to analyze the condition according to which freedom is a right: coexistence with the freedom of every other in accord with a universal law. I will claim that such a condition does not imply political authority. Finally, we have to handle the connection between the innate right to freedom and our humanity. I will claim that the innate right to freedomcannot be disconnected from the second formula of the categorical imperative. 2015-07-08 2022-03-21T17:55:33Z 2022-03-21T17:55:33Z info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/ek/article/view/5119 10.36311/2318-0501/2015.v3n01.5119 http://biblioteca-repositorio.clacso.edu.ar/handle/CLACSO/72599 por https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/ek/article/view/5119/3608 Copyright (c) 2015 Estudos Kantianos [EK] application/pdf Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências Kantian Studies (EK); Vol. 3 No. 01 (2015) Estudos Kantianos [EK]; v. 3 n. 01 (2015) 2318-0501 |
| spellingShingle | FAGGION, Andrea Remarks on “the Only Original Right Belonging to Every Man by Virtue of His Humanity” |
| title | Remarks on “the Only Original Right Belonging to Every Man by Virtue of His Humanity” |
| title_full | Remarks on “the Only Original Right Belonging to Every Man by Virtue of His Humanity” |
| title_fullStr | Remarks on “the Only Original Right Belonging to Every Man by Virtue of His Humanity” |
| title_full_unstemmed | Remarks on “the Only Original Right Belonging to Every Man by Virtue of His Humanity” |
| title_short | Remarks on “the Only Original Right Belonging to Every Man by Virtue of His Humanity” |
| title_sort | remarks on “the only original right belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity” |
| url | https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/ek/article/view/5119 http://biblioteca-repositorio.clacso.edu.ar/handle/CLACSO/72599 |