Biblioteca Digital de VanguardiaCrossing the Ocean by Feeling for the BITs: Investor-State Arbitration in China’s Bilateral Investment Treaties
Although China began to sign bilateral investment treaties (BITs) in the 1970s, it refused to grant foreign investors the right to sue their host government in international arbitration tribunals. Few realize that China’s treaty negotiators have in fact abandoned this restriction in almost every Chi...
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| Formato: | info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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Universidad del Pacífico
2012
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| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.up.edu.pe/index.php/apuntes/article/view/666 http://biblioteca-repositorio.clacso.edu.ar/handle/CLACSO/52997 |
| _version_ | 1782339398252101632 |
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| author | Irwin, Amos |
| author_facet | Irwin, Amos |
| author_sort | Irwin, Amos |
| collection | Repositorio |
| description | Although China began to sign bilateral investment treaties (BITs) in the 1970s, it refused to grant foreign investors the right to sue their host government in international arbitration tribunals. Few realize that China’s treaty negotiators have in fact abandoned this restriction in almost every Chinese BIT signed since 1998, including those with Latin America. Scholars have suggested that China reversed its policy in order to support Chinese overseas investors or to fit its general economic liberalization strategy. However, China’s BITs with Mexico, Peru, and Colombia as well as its arbitration case with Peru contradict these theories. I argue that China began signing open BITs to test the risks of granting open access to European countries and the United States, for whom open access is a key condition. China experimented gradually with open arbitration, just as it has experimented gradually with many economic changes since Reform and Opening began in 1978. This theory has interesting implicationsfor China’s future BITs—as international arbitration tribunals threaten to make this experiment permanent, China has added new restrictions that bring China’s BITs closer to the US model and make a US-China BIT more likely. However, the US avoids BITs with capital-exporting countries, and China is now a large capital-exporter. The main obstacle to US-China BIT negotiations may no longer be the two nations’ differences, but rather their similarities. |
| format | info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
| id | clacso-CLACSO52997 |
| institution | CLACSO, Repositorio Digital |
| language | Español |
| publishDate | 2012 |
| publisher | Universidad del Pacífico |
| record_format | greenstone |
| spelling | clacso-CLACSO529972022-03-17T18:48:09Z Crossing the Ocean by Feeling for the BITs: Investor-State Arbitration in China’s Bilateral Investment Treaties Atravesando el océano pensando en los TBI: arbitraje inversionista-Estado en los tratados bilaterales de inversión chinos Irwin, Amos Although China began to sign bilateral investment treaties (BITs) in the 1970s, it refused to grant foreign investors the right to sue their host government in international arbitration tribunals. Few realize that China’s treaty negotiators have in fact abandoned this restriction in almost every Chinese BIT signed since 1998, including those with Latin America. Scholars have suggested that China reversed its policy in order to support Chinese overseas investors or to fit its general economic liberalization strategy. However, China’s BITs with Mexico, Peru, and Colombia as well as its arbitration case with Peru contradict these theories. I argue that China began signing open BITs to test the risks of granting open access to European countries and the United States, for whom open access is a key condition. China experimented gradually with open arbitration, just as it has experimented gradually with many economic changes since Reform and Opening began in 1978. This theory has interesting implicationsfor China’s future BITs—as international arbitration tribunals threaten to make this experiment permanent, China has added new restrictions that bring China’s BITs closer to the US model and make a US-China BIT more likely. However, the US avoids BITs with capital-exporting countries, and China is now a large capital-exporter. The main obstacle to US-China BIT negotiations may no longer be the two nations’ differences, but rather their similarities. Si bien China empezó a suscribir tratados bilaterales de inversión (TBI) en la década de 1970, se negó a otorgar a los inversionistas extranjeros el derecho a demandar al gobierno anfitrión en las cortes internacionales de arbitraje. Pocos se dan cuenta de que los negociadores chinos de tratados han abandonado de hecho esta restricción en casi todos los TBI suscritos desde 1998, incluidos aquellos con Latinoamérica. Los académicos han sugerido que China revirtió su política con el propósito de respaldar en el exterior a los inversionistas chinos o para ajustar su estrategia general de liberalización económica. No obstante, los TBI de China con México, el Perú y Colombia, así como su caso de arbitraje con el Perú, contradicen estas teorías. Sostengo que China empezó a firmar TBI abiertos para sopesar los riesgos de otorgar acceso abierto a los países europeos y a los Estados Unidos, para los cuales el libre acceso constituye una condición clave. China experimentó gradualmente con el arbitraje abierto, al igual que ha experimentado gradualmente con muchos cambios económicos desde la Reforma y Apertura iniciada en 1978. Esta teoría porta consecuencias interesantes para los futuros TBI chinos –a medida que las cortes internacionales de arbitraje amenazan con convertir este experimento en permanente, China ha añadido nuevas restricciones que acercan los TBI chinos al modelo estadounidense y hacen que sea más posible un TBI EE.UU.-China–. Sin embargo, los Estados Unidos evitan los TBI con países exportadores de capital, y China es hoy en día un gran exportador de capital. El principal obstáculo para las negociaciones EE.UU.-China podría ser ya no las diferencias entre los dos países, sino más bien sus similitudes. 2012-02-17 2022-03-17T18:48:09Z 2022-03-17T18:48:09Z info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion https://revistas.up.edu.pe/index.php/apuntes/article/view/666 10.21678/apuntes.71.666 http://biblioteca-repositorio.clacso.edu.ar/handle/CLACSO/52997 spa https://revistas.up.edu.pe/index.php/apuntes/article/view/666/665 Derechos de autor 2017 Apuntes http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 application/pdf Universidad del Pacífico Apuntes. Social Sciences Journal; Apuntes 71: Relaciones comerciales y políticas entre China y América Latina; 217-240 Apuntes. Revista de ciencias sociales; Apuntes 71: Relaciones comerciales y políticas entre China y América Latina; 217-240 2223-1757 0252-1865 |
| spellingShingle | Irwin, Amos Crossing the Ocean by Feeling for the BITs: Investor-State Arbitration in China’s Bilateral Investment Treaties |
| title | Crossing the Ocean by Feeling for the BITs: Investor-State Arbitration in China’s Bilateral Investment Treaties |
| title_full | Crossing the Ocean by Feeling for the BITs: Investor-State Arbitration in China’s Bilateral Investment Treaties |
| title_fullStr | Crossing the Ocean by Feeling for the BITs: Investor-State Arbitration in China’s Bilateral Investment Treaties |
| title_full_unstemmed | Crossing the Ocean by Feeling for the BITs: Investor-State Arbitration in China’s Bilateral Investment Treaties |
| title_short | Crossing the Ocean by Feeling for the BITs: Investor-State Arbitration in China’s Bilateral Investment Treaties |
| title_sort | crossing the ocean by feeling for the bits: investor-state arbitration in china’s bilateral investment treaties |
| url | https://revistas.up.edu.pe/index.php/apuntes/article/view/666 http://biblioteca-repositorio.clacso.edu.ar/handle/CLACSO/52997 |