Biblioteca Digital de VanguardiaThe controversy between the Committee of Electric Tariffs and electric distribution firms in Metropolitan Lima: A game theory approach
In September 1997, CTE set a new distribution rate after estimating the investment value, called New Replacement Value (VNR) for power distribution utilities in Peru. This estimation is an indispensable tool to set rates for 1997-2001 but raised a controversy between CTE and the regulated companies...
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| Formato: | info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
| Publicado: |
Universidad del Pacífico
1999
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| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.up.edu.pe/index.php/apuntes/article/view/487 http://biblioteca-repositorio.clacso.edu.ar/handle/CLACSO/52818 |
| _version_ | 1782335797425340416 |
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| author | Bonifaz F., Jose Luis |
| author_facet | Bonifaz F., Jose Luis |
| author_sort | Bonifaz F., Jose Luis |
| collection | Repositorio |
| description | In September 1997, CTE set a new distribution rate after estimating the investment value, called New Replacement Value (VNR) for power distribution utilities in Peru. This estimation is an indispensable tool to set rates for 1997-2001 but raised a controversy between CTE and the regulated companies that reached the judiciary and generated a series of contradictory opinions on rate setting, regulation methods and LCE opinions. A theoretical model of game theory show that if the agents acting maximizing profits, the Nash equilibrium will be appropriate by the LCE. Although, if there are exist a deviation by "populist" causes the equilibrium will be inefficient for the user but harmful for the company. In the next period, the companies will have incentives for underinvestment or recoil of the business but will never invest efficiently. We concluded that the important question is not if the regulatory entity is independent or not. The most important is that the government provides a believable commitment, as much to consumers as to investors for the development of the sector. |
| format | info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
| id | clacso-CLACSO52818 |
| institution | CLACSO, Repositorio Digital |
| language | Español |
| publishDate | 1999 |
| publisher | Universidad del Pacífico |
| record_format | greenstone |
| spelling | clacso-CLACSO528182022-03-17T18:47:59Z The controversy between the Committee of Electric Tariffs and electric distribution firms in Metropolitan Lima: A game theory approach La controversia entre la Comisión de Tarifas Eléctricas y las empresas de distribución de energía eléctrica de Lima Metropolitana: Un enfoque de teoría de juegos Bonifaz F., Jose Luis In September 1997, CTE set a new distribution rate after estimating the investment value, called New Replacement Value (VNR) for power distribution utilities in Peru. This estimation is an indispensable tool to set rates for 1997-2001 but raised a controversy between CTE and the regulated companies that reached the judiciary and generated a series of contradictory opinions on rate setting, regulation methods and LCE opinions. A theoretical model of game theory show that if the agents acting maximizing profits, the Nash equilibrium will be appropriate by the LCE. Although, if there are exist a deviation by "populist" causes the equilibrium will be inefficient for the user but harmful for the company. In the next period, the companies will have incentives for underinvestment or recoil of the business but will never invest efficiently. We concluded that the important question is not if the regulatory entity is independent or not. The most important is that the government provides a believable commitment, as much to consumers as to investors for the development of the sector. En setiembre de 1997, la Comisión de Tarifas Eléctricos (CTE) fijó una nueva tarifa de distribución, tras estimar el valor de la inversión de las empresas (VNR) de distribución eléctrica en Perú. Dicha estimación, que es un requisito indispensable para el proceso de fijación de la tarifa para el periodo 1997-2001, suscita una controversia entre la CTE y las empresas reguladas, la cual es materia de este artículo, por la divergencia entre las redes subterráneas y aéreas que son reconocidas en dicho proceso tarifario. Utilizando la Teoría de Juegos para el análisis de dicha controversia, se observa que si los agentes actúan maximizando sus beneficios, el equilibrio de Nash del juego será el deseado por el modelo teórico detrás de la Ley de Concesiones Eléctricos (LCE). Sin embargo, si existen desvíos por motivos "populistas", el equilibrio se torna eficiente para el usuario pero perjudicial para la empresa. Se puede observar que, en el siguiente periodo, las empresas tendrán incentivos para sub-invertir o para retirarse del negocio, pero nunca jugarán a invertir eficientemente dados los resultados supuestos en el primer juego. Se concluye que la "independencia" del ente regulador no es un fin en sí, sino un medio. Lo que interesa, finalmente, no es tanto si el ente regulador es independiente o no, sino que a través de él, el Estado provea de un compromiso creíble, tanto a los consumidores como a los inversionistas para garantizar el desarrollo del sector. 1999-10-13 2022-03-17T18:47:59Z 2022-03-17T18:47:59Z info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion https://revistas.up.edu.pe/index.php/apuntes/article/view/487 10.21678/apuntes.45.487 http://biblioteca-repositorio.clacso.edu.ar/handle/CLACSO/52818 spa https://revistas.up.edu.pe/index.php/apuntes/article/view/487/489 Derechos de autor 2017 Apuntes http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 application/pdf Universidad del Pacífico Apuntes. Social Sciences Journal; Apuntes 45; 65-81 Apuntes. Revista de ciencias sociales; Apuntes 45; 65-81 2223-1757 0252-1865 |
| spellingShingle | Bonifaz F., Jose Luis The controversy between the Committee of Electric Tariffs and electric distribution firms in Metropolitan Lima: A game theory approach |
| title | The controversy between the Committee of Electric Tariffs and electric distribution firms in Metropolitan Lima: A game theory approach |
| title_full | The controversy between the Committee of Electric Tariffs and electric distribution firms in Metropolitan Lima: A game theory approach |
| title_fullStr | The controversy between the Committee of Electric Tariffs and electric distribution firms in Metropolitan Lima: A game theory approach |
| title_full_unstemmed | The controversy between the Committee of Electric Tariffs and electric distribution firms in Metropolitan Lima: A game theory approach |
| title_short | The controversy between the Committee of Electric Tariffs and electric distribution firms in Metropolitan Lima: A game theory approach |
| title_sort | controversy between the committee of electric tariffs and electric distribution firms in metropolitan lima: a game theory approach |
| url | https://revistas.up.edu.pe/index.php/apuntes/article/view/487 http://biblioteca-repositorio.clacso.edu.ar/handle/CLACSO/52818 |