Aprovação de empréstimos a governos subnacionais no Brasil: há espaço para comportamento político oportunista?

The aim of this study was to test whether political influence comes into play in the approval of loans to State governments by the Brazilian National Senate. Although all the requests for loans submitted to the Senate during the period under study were approved, we demonstrate that the time required...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Paulo Roberto Arvate, Ciro Biderman, Marcos Mendes
Formato: artículo científico
Lenguaje:Portugués
Publicado: Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2008
Materias:
Acceso en línea:http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=21817687006
http://biblioteca-repositorio.clacso.edu.ar/handle/CLACSO/49082
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author Paulo Roberto Arvate
Ciro Biderman
Marcos Mendes
author_facet Paulo Roberto Arvate
Ciro Biderman
Marcos Mendes
author_sort Paulo Roberto Arvate
collection Repositorio
description The aim of this study was to test whether political influence comes into play in the approval of loans to State governments by the Brazilian National Senate. Although all the requests for loans submitted to the Senate during the period under study were approved, we demonstrate that the time required for approval depends on the political relationship between the applicant (State Governor) and the Senate members occupying key positions in the review process. Using "survival analysis" technique, we observed that when the State Governor requesting the loan and the Senator reporting on the matter belong to the same party coalition that helped elect the Governor, loans are approved in less time. On the other hand, approval takes longer if the partisan relationship is broken during the loan review process. Finally, we observed that the more loan applications from a single State in the previous six months, the longer the approval time for a new request. This analysis considered all State loan applications reviewed by the Brazilian Senate from 1989 to 2001.
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spelling clacso-CLACSO490822022-03-17T17:56:40Z Aprovação de empréstimos a governos subnacionais no Brasil: há espaço para comportamento político oportunista? Paulo Roberto Arvate Ciro Biderman Marcos Mendes Sociología Fiscal Federalism Senate States (Survival Analysis) Loan Approval Public Debt The aim of this study was to test whether political influence comes into play in the approval of loans to State governments by the Brazilian National Senate. Although all the requests for loans submitted to the Senate during the period under study were approved, we demonstrate that the time required for approval depends on the political relationship between the applicant (State Governor) and the Senate members occupying key positions in the review process. Using "survival analysis" technique, we observed that when the State Governor requesting the loan and the Senator reporting on the matter belong to the same party coalition that helped elect the Governor, loans are approved in less time. On the other hand, approval takes longer if the partisan relationship is broken during the loan review process. Finally, we observed that the more loan applications from a single State in the previous six months, the longer the approval time for a new request. This analysis considered all State loan applications reviewed by the Brazilian Senate from 1989 to 2001. 2008 2022-03-17T17:56:40Z 2022-03-17T17:56:40Z artículo científico http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=21817687006 http://biblioteca-repositorio.clacso.edu.ar/handle/CLACSO/49082 pt http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=218 Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociais application/pdf Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociais (Brasil) Num.4 Vol.51
spellingShingle Sociología
Fiscal Federalism
Senate
States (Survival Analysis)
Loan Approval
Public Debt
Paulo Roberto Arvate
Ciro Biderman
Marcos Mendes
Aprovação de empréstimos a governos subnacionais no Brasil: há espaço para comportamento político oportunista?
title Aprovação de empréstimos a governos subnacionais no Brasil: há espaço para comportamento político oportunista?
title_full Aprovação de empréstimos a governos subnacionais no Brasil: há espaço para comportamento político oportunista?
title_fullStr Aprovação de empréstimos a governos subnacionais no Brasil: há espaço para comportamento político oportunista?
title_full_unstemmed Aprovação de empréstimos a governos subnacionais no Brasil: há espaço para comportamento político oportunista?
title_short Aprovação de empréstimos a governos subnacionais no Brasil: há espaço para comportamento político oportunista?
title_sort aprovação de empréstimos a governos subnacionais no brasil: há espaço para comportamento político oportunista?
topic Sociología
Fiscal Federalism
Senate
States (Survival Analysis)
Loan Approval
Public Debt
url http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=21817687006
http://biblioteca-repositorio.clacso.edu.ar/handle/CLACSO/49082