Aprovação de empréstimos a governos subnacionais no Brasil: há espaço para comportamento político oportunista?
The aim of this study was to test whether political influence comes into play in the approval of loans to State governments by the Brazilian National Senate. Although all the requests for loans submitted to the Senate during the period under study were approved, we demonstrate that the time required...
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Formato: | artículo científico |
Lenguaje: | Portugués |
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Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro
2008
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Acceso en línea: | http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=21817687006 http://biblioteca-repositorio.clacso.edu.ar/handle/CLACSO/49082 |
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author | Paulo Roberto Arvate Ciro Biderman Marcos Mendes |
author_facet | Paulo Roberto Arvate Ciro Biderman Marcos Mendes |
author_sort | Paulo Roberto Arvate |
collection | Repositorio |
description | The aim of this study was to test whether political influence comes into play in the approval of loans to State governments by the Brazilian National Senate. Although all the requests for loans submitted to the Senate during the period under study were approved, we demonstrate that the time required for approval depends on the political relationship between the applicant (State Governor) and the Senate members occupying key positions in the review process. Using "survival analysis" technique, we observed that when the State Governor requesting the loan and the Senator reporting on the matter belong to the same party coalition that helped elect the Governor, loans are approved in less time. On the other hand, approval takes longer if the partisan relationship is broken during the loan review process. Finally, we observed that the more loan applications from a single State in the previous six months, the longer the approval time for a new request. This analysis considered all State loan applications reviewed by the Brazilian Senate from 1989 to 2001. |
format | artículo científico |
id | clacso-CLACSO49082 |
institution | CLACSO, Repositorio Digital |
language | Portugués |
publishDate | 2008 |
publisher | Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro |
record_format | greenstone |
spelling | clacso-CLACSO490822022-03-17T17:56:40Z Aprovação de empréstimos a governos subnacionais no Brasil: há espaço para comportamento político oportunista? Paulo Roberto Arvate Ciro Biderman Marcos Mendes Sociología Fiscal Federalism Senate States (Survival Analysis) Loan Approval Public Debt The aim of this study was to test whether political influence comes into play in the approval of loans to State governments by the Brazilian National Senate. Although all the requests for loans submitted to the Senate during the period under study were approved, we demonstrate that the time required for approval depends on the political relationship between the applicant (State Governor) and the Senate members occupying key positions in the review process. Using "survival analysis" technique, we observed that when the State Governor requesting the loan and the Senator reporting on the matter belong to the same party coalition that helped elect the Governor, loans are approved in less time. On the other hand, approval takes longer if the partisan relationship is broken during the loan review process. Finally, we observed that the more loan applications from a single State in the previous six months, the longer the approval time for a new request. This analysis considered all State loan applications reviewed by the Brazilian Senate from 1989 to 2001. 2008 2022-03-17T17:56:40Z 2022-03-17T17:56:40Z artículo científico http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=21817687006 http://biblioteca-repositorio.clacso.edu.ar/handle/CLACSO/49082 pt http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=218 Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociais application/pdf Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociais (Brasil) Num.4 Vol.51 |
spellingShingle | Sociología Fiscal Federalism Senate States (Survival Analysis) Loan Approval Public Debt Paulo Roberto Arvate Ciro Biderman Marcos Mendes Aprovação de empréstimos a governos subnacionais no Brasil: há espaço para comportamento político oportunista? |
title | Aprovação de empréstimos a governos subnacionais no Brasil: há espaço para comportamento político oportunista? |
title_full | Aprovação de empréstimos a governos subnacionais no Brasil: há espaço para comportamento político oportunista? |
title_fullStr | Aprovação de empréstimos a governos subnacionais no Brasil: há espaço para comportamento político oportunista? |
title_full_unstemmed | Aprovação de empréstimos a governos subnacionais no Brasil: há espaço para comportamento político oportunista? |
title_short | Aprovação de empréstimos a governos subnacionais no Brasil: há espaço para comportamento político oportunista? |
title_sort | aprovação de empréstimos a governos subnacionais no brasil: há espaço para comportamento político oportunista? |
topic | Sociología Fiscal Federalism Senate States (Survival Analysis) Loan Approval Public Debt |
url | http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=21817687006 http://biblioteca-repositorio.clacso.edu.ar/handle/CLACSO/49082 |